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Abstract 
Melnik et al. [Melnik, A., Shy, Oz, Stenbacka, R. Assessing market dominance. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 68, 63-72] have proposed a new statistic to assess market dominance. In this comment we expand their 
discussion of certain mathematical properties in their analysis and link their methodology to some previous approaches.
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       1 
“Normally, dominance destroys parity” 




In a recent paper Melnik et al. (2008) suggest a novel approach to the existence of dominance of 
the leading firm in an industry.
1 The formula they put forward, they claim, can be easily applied 
in antitrust cases by competition and regulatory agencies without the requirement of estimating 
demand elasticities or marginal costs, the latter being notoriously difficult to obtain. Their 
approach is to be commended since they restore the prominence of the market share concept that 
has been given (in our view, unduly) short shrift by some recent research.
2 
 
By relating the paper to previous papers by LaCour and Møllgaard (2002, 2003) and Dobbs and 
Richards (2005) to which Melnik et al. (2008) do not refer, the purpose of the present comment 
is firstly, to show the interconnection of these approaches and, secondly, to elaborate on this 
paper by checking the validity of the main findings and to expand on them. 
 
The  proposed  single-market  measure  (“threshold”),  which  would  enable  regulators  to  draw 
inferences about dominance of the leading firm, takes the following form
3: 
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where  si  are  firm  market  shares  indexed  in  an  order  satisfying  s1s2 …sN,  and  γ  is  an 
exogenous  parameter  interpreted  “as  an  industry-specific  assessment  of  the  entry  barriers 
relevant for the industry. Lower values of γ correspond to lower entry barriers, which would 
mean that potential (future) competition will limit the ability of firm 1 to exploit its market 
power more effectively” (ibid., p. 65). 
 
We proceed by equating the share of the second largest firm (s2) to (1-Σsi-s1). Thus, equation (1) 






1 [2 (1 ) (1 ) ]
2
D
ii s s s s                                      (2) 
 
 
2. The parameter γ 
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1  The  paper  by  Hellmer  and  Wårell  (2009,  p.  3239)  describe  the  paper  as  “interesting  and 
intriguing”. 
2 On this, see the earlier discussion in Shepherd et al. (2000). 
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where Q is the industry’s output, q1 the leading firm’s output z=ΔQ/Δq1. Additionally, according 
to Dobbs and Richards (ibid., p. 573): “more usually, output restriction [by the leading firm] will 
give rise to some degree of reduction in total output, and hence to a positive ORT elasticity”
4. 
These authors claim that, under reasonable assumptions, this elasticity will lie between zero and 
one. Thus, expression (2) can be written as: 
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For this partial derivative to become negati ve, as Melnik et al. (2008, pp. 66, 69) maintain, the 
following  inequality  should  apply:  1-(2ε
ORT)/z<  Σsi  <1,  where  0<Σsi<1  and  as  hypothesized 
ε
ORT< z  (since s1=ε
ORT/z and 0<s1<1) and 0< ε
ORT, z<1 or put differently, 1-2s1< Σsi, 1- s1<1- s2, 
1-2 s1<1- s1- s2 which is obviously valid. In the same vein, for the partial derivative to be positive 
the inequality 1-2 s1> Σsi should hold. But this cannot happen since 1- s1>1- s2 is not valid as 
s1>s2  by  construction.  Consequently,  the  finding  of  Melnik  et  al.  (2008)  that  there  exists  a 
negative relationship between the parameter γ and the dominance threshold is validated by using 
the output-restriction-test elasticity (ORT) without actually having to estimate the latter. In sum, 
more significant  entry barriers (more significant  competition) are (is) associated with higher 




Moreover, Dobbs and Richards (op.cit., p. 574) maintain that, in the case of a homogenous good 
Cournot  industry,  “assuming  locally  linear  demand  and  constant  marginal  costs,  the  ORT 
elasticity for any given firm, at the current Cournot equilibrium, is simply the market share of 
that firm divided by the total number of firms in the industry”: that is ε
CORT = si /N. In this case, 
expression (2) can be written as: 
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For  this  partial  derivative  to  become  negative,  as  Melnik  et al. (2008, pp. 66, 69) argue, the 
following inequality should hold: 1-2Nε
CORT< Σsi which is equivalent to 1-2s1<1- s1- s2; and is 
                                                 
4 In the words of Azevedo and Walker (2002, p. 366):”Any firm can restrict its own output, but 
in most markets any unilateral output restriction would be replaced by an output expansion by 
other players in the market. This is not true of a dominant firm’s output restriction”. Also, “The 
greater the firm’s market share the less likely that other firms will be able to expand production 
to defeat the unilateral price increase” (McFalls, 1997). 
5 We doubt the correctness of equating higher strictness of the dominance criterion with a lower 
value of  s
D  (Melnik  et  al.  2008,  p.  65).  On  the  contrary,  we  think  that  higher  strictness  is 
associated with a higher value of s
D and vice versa.   3 
also valid since s1 > s2. Furthermore, as we proved previously in the case of the OPT elasticity 
and  for  the  same  reasons,  the  partial  derivative  cannot  be  positive.  Therefore,  the  negative 
relationship between the parameter γ and the dominance threshold is established once again. 
 
We now turn to the papers by LaCour and Møllgaard (2002, 2003). One of the factors considered 
in testing for dominant position is the own-price elasticity, ε
own=-(Δq1/Δp1).(p1/q1) which we can 
transform into ε
own=-(Δq1/Δp1).(p1/s1Q) and hence s1=y/ε
own where y=-(Δq1/Δp1).(p1/Q). From 
expression (2) we then get: 
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It is easily shown, as before, that this partial derivative can only be negative, thus corroborating 
the Melnik et al. (2008) finding. 
 
3. The elasticities 
From equations (4), (6) and (8) we can get the following partial derivatives of s
D with respect to 
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  ,    where 0< i s  <1, y<0 and  > 0          (12) 
 
With reference to equations (10) and (11) we can infer that both results are plausible since the 
higher  the  value  of  the  elasticity  the  less  the  remaining  firms  can  counteract  the  change 
(decrease) in quantity initiated by the leading firm, reflecting a state of weak competition. Thus 
the threshold required for dominance need not be high. As far as the  own-price  elasticity is 
concerned, the negative value of the partial derivative indicates that the higher (in absolute terms 
- or the lower in negative terms) the elasticity, the lower the dominance threshold. This is, again, 
plausible and accords to what LaCour and Møllgaard (2003, p.133) point out: “A very high 
negative value of ε is a sign that the demand curve disciplines the firm strongly: customers rush 
away if the price is increased”. 
 
4. The joint market share of all but the two largest firms 
We come to the final variable under review, namely the joint market share of all but the two 
largest firms. According to Melnik et al. (2008, p. 65) “…the dominance threshold is lower… 
the higher is the joint market share of the two largest firms” or alternatively, the dominance 
threshold is lower the lower the joint market share of the remaining firms (Σsi).   4 
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These relations can be summarized in one expression: 
s
D / Σsi 
>
<   0  when s1 
>
<   1- Σsi 
But the positive partial derivative is not validated since s1>s1+s2 cannot hold, thus the higher the 
joint share of the remaining firms (Σsi) the lower the dominance threshold. This is, however, the 
opposite of the Melnik et al. result. Thus, a word of caution and further elaboration are needed. 
 
The partial derivatives presented above are valid only when s1 is kept constant. This means that if 
the Σsi decreases (increases), as s1 remains constant, the share of the second largest firm (s2) goes 
up (goes down) resulting in the decrease (increase) of (s1-s2) which in turn tends to raise (lower) 
the threshold (s
D). At the same time though, the increase (decrease) of (1- Σsi) exerts a negative 
(positive) influence on the threshold (s
D) but not as strong as the positive (negative) contribution 
of the diminution (enlargement) of the market share difference of the two largest firms, hence the 
overall  increase  of  the  threshold  (s
D).  Consequently,  Melnik  et  al.  err  in  stating  “…the 
dominance threshold is lower…the higher is the joint market share of the two largest firms…” 
(p.65) as the comparison of market E with either market C or market D of their Table 1 (p. 66) 
indicates. The diminution of the market share difference predominates, causing the increase of 
the dominance threshold (s
D) despite the increase of (s1+s2). 
 
If however, the market share difference remains constant, which is not an option in our equations 
(4), (6) and (8), when Σsi varies, then the threshold increases (decreases) as Σsi goes up (goes 
down). Obviously, if all three shares, i.e. s1, s2 and Σsi, vary concurrently, then it is not possible 
to attribute the new value of the dominance threshold to the change of a single variable. 
 
The following table provides a self-explanatory numerical example of our previous arguments: 
 
Table 1 
Market shares and firm dominance thresholds 
Market  s1  s2  s1- s2  Σsi   s
D 
A  0.40  0.15  0.25  0.45  0.43 
B  0.40  0.25  0.15  0.35  0.45 
C  0.45  0.20  0.25  0.35  0.42 
D  0.45  0.30  0.15  0.25  0.44 
E  0.35  0.20  0.15  0.45  0.46   5 
5. Conclusion 
It has been argued, echoing the Chicago-school view, that “the presumption associating market 
power with high market shares is rebuttable” (Hay, 1992, p. 822). Along the same lines, “…the 
case law puts a great deal of stock in the size of market shares in inferences of market power - a 
general inference that modern economics tells us is not supported by either theory or empirical 
evidence” (Scheffman, 1992, p. 919). However, opponents of this view have maintained that “… 
market share is the leading fact, the most basic determinant of the degree of competition or 
monopoly”  (Shepherd  et  al.,  2001,  p.  841).  Neither  view  elevates  “market  share”  into  the 
absolute criterion or denigrates it to such an extent as to render it completely inoperable and 
useless.
6 As Melnik et al. suggest and as the present comment has insisted other factors also 
come into play. Generally speaking, the fast-track formula seems to rest on solid grounds. But 
the use of supplementary  variables, whose estimation  is  admittedly more demanding, would 
impact on the study of dominance in a more useful manner. 
 
 
                                                 
6 “Though market shares are recognized to be important, no serious scholar has claimed that they 
control  market  outcomes  precisely.  They  are  simply  the  best  single  indicator,  as  business 
experience has also fully recognized. Their evidence establishes a presumption about market 
power’s possible effect in raising price, which secondary conditions may modify” (Shepherd et 
al., 2000, p.852, fn. 26) and “The relationship between market share and market power is not 
exact  or tight….But  within any market,  larger market  shares  give significantly more market 
power; and in almost every market, market shares above 30% provide substantial market power. 
That is one reason why firms struggle so relentlessly to gain more market share” (ibid., p. 860, 
fn. 42).   6 
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